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I. Introduction

The central topic of scholarship on criminal procedure in the
United States is the Warren Court’s “criminal procedure
revolution” of the early 1960s.1 The literature now includes at
least seven important narratives about the Warren Court
criminal cases. First, a conservative narrative denounces the
Warren Court for imposing judge-made law without due regard
for the cost to social control of the new rules.2 Second, a liberal
narrative abetted and then celebrated the Warren Court.3 As the
Court became more sympathetic to law enforcement during the
1970s and since, liberals criticized the post-Warren justices for
failing to give the Warren Court landmarks a principled defense.4
In the liberal narrative, perverse legislative incentives call on
grounds of process theory for an active judicial role on behalf of
suspects, defendants, and prisoners drawn disproportionately
from disempowered groups, especially African-Americans.5 The
1. See, e.g., Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 478–79 (1966) (holding that
the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination mandates that police
notify individuals in police custody of their right to remain silent and the right
to counsel); Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 344 (1963) (declaring that
indigent criminal defendants in state criminal prosecutions have a right to
court-appointed counsel). These and other criminal procedure decisions of the
Warren Court are regarded as landmarks in criminal law. See, e.g., Bernard E.
Harcourt, Imagery and Adjudication in the Criminal Law: The Relationship
Between Images of Criminal Defendants and Ideologies of Criminal Law in
Southern Antebellum and Modern Appellate Decisions, 61 BROOK. L. REV. 1165,
1166 (1995) (describing Gideon and Miranda as “landmark decisions of the
Warren Court”); Bruce R. Jacob, Memories of and Reflections About Gideon v.
Wainwright, 33 STETSON L. REV. 181, 185 (2003) (calling Gideon a “landmark
right-to-counsel case”).
2. See, e.g., Henry J. Friendly, The Bill of Rights as a Code of Criminal
Procedure, 53 CAL. L. REV. 929, 955 (1965) (“Justices are too sophisticated really
to believe that the first eight amendments speak so clearly on every issue as to
make irrelevant the hard facts of life.”).
3. See, e.g., Yale Kamisar, A Dissent from the Miranda Dissents: Some
Comments on the “New” Fifth Amendment and the “Old” Voluntariness Test, 65
MICH. L. REV. 59, 62 (1966) (arguing that the protections defendants received
before Miranda were “largely ‘illusory’”).
4. See, e.g., Alan M. Dershowitz & John Hart Ely, Harris v. New York:
Some Anxious Observations on the Candor and Logic of the Emerging Nixon
Majority, 80 YALE L.J. 1198, 1199 (1971) (accusing the Burger Court “of what is,
at best, gross negligence concerning the state of the record and the controlling
precedents”).
5. See Donald A. Dripps, Criminal Procedure, Footnote Four, and the
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liberal narrative points to the long legislative record of
indifference or even hostility to the rights of suspects and
defendants, the persistent and extreme neglect of indigent
defense being a prominent example.6 Drawing bleaker
conclusions from similar premises, a third, more radical narrative
read the Warren Court canon not as revolution, but as
legitimation and entrenchment.7
The clash of traditional liberal and conservative narratives
has never entirely abated.8 That clash, however, lost much of its
currency after the “punitive turn” in American criminal justice
Theory of Public Choice; or, Why Don’t Legislatures Give a Damn about the
Rights of the Accused?, 44 SYRACUSE L. REV. 1079, 1081 (1993) (arguing that
“active judicial development of constitutional rules governing police,
prosecutors, and the criminal trial process is a legitimate exercise of judicial
review”); Michael J. Klarman, The Puzzling Resistance to Political Process
Theory, 77 VA. L. REV. 747, 831 (1991) (“[The] Supreme Court must be
prepared . . . to bar governmentally-imposed burdens on disfranchised groups
even when popular opinion strongly endorses them, not just when
transformation of racial attitudes has rendered those burdens increasingly
anachronistic.”).
6. See Note, Gideon’s Promise Unfulfilled: The Need for Litigated Reform
of Indigent Defense, 113 HARV. L. REV. 2062, 2067–68 (2000) [hereinafter
Gideon’s Promise Unfulfilled] (“Criminal defendants comprise a political
constituency with little, if any, leverage; indeed, many felony convicts are
formally disenfranchised. Public choice theory clearly predicts, and experience
demonstrates, that indigent defense will be undersupported.” (footnotes
omitted)).
7. See Louis Michael Seidman, Brown and Miranda, 80 CAL. L. REV. 673,
746 (1992) (noting that because “there is no organized political campaign
comparable to the civil-rights movement dedicated to defending the rights of
criminal suspects, there is no group that can take even limited advantage of the
Miranda ‘victory’”). Seidman argued that in Miranda “the Court ended up
contributing to the smugness and self-satisfaction that are the main enemies of
growth and reform.” Id. at 747. For application to Gideon, see Kenneth B. Nunn,
The Trial as Text: Allegory, Myth and Symbol in the Adversarial Criminal
Process—A Critique of the Role of the Public Defender and a Proposal for
Reform, 32 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 743, 812–13 (1995) (“All that is needed to account
for judicial economy and legitimacy is a public defender who appears competent,
no matter how rough an appearance it may be.”).
8. Compare, e.g., WILLIAM PIZZI, TRIALS WITHOUT TRUTH (1999) 139, 152–
53 (1999) (arguing that our criminal justice system is flawed because it is overly
adversarial, is too much of a gamble, and is not concerned with seeking the
truth), with Richard S. Frase, The Whole Truth About American and European
Criminal Justice, 3 BUFF. CRIM. L. REV. 785, 846–47 (2000) (reviewing Pizzi and
arguing that the American criminal justice system is “much more devoted to
truth-seeking than Pizzi claims, . . . [is] less committed to procedural rights . . . .
[and] is also less strongly adversary than Pizzi suggests”).
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policy. During the second half of the 1980s and ever since,
sentencing policy throughout most of the country became both
more severe and, with respect to the judiciary, less discretionary.9
Public prosecutors with plenary discretion to select the charges
that trigger fixed-sentencing consequences became the most
important actors in the system.10 Guilty pleas, which accounted
for about four out of five convictions through the 1970s, accounted
for more than nine of ten by the end of the twentieth century.11
The punitive turn coincided with another dramatic
development in criminal justice—DNA exonerations. The
prevailing wisdom, often assumed in liberal as well as
conservative narratives, held that (virtually) all criminal
defendants are in fact guilty.12 The DNA technique shook that
confidence. In 1996, a review of tens of thousands of DNA tests
requested by law enforcement found that about a quarter of the
conclusive tests exonerated the suspect.13
The punitive turn and the innocence movement supported
different, if not entirely new, narratives about the Warren Court’s
revolution. The innocence movement informed and reinforced a
fourth narrative concerned with factual accuracy. The accuracy
narrative faulted the Warren Court for neglecting due process in
favor of Fourth, Fifth, and Sixth Amendment rights that often
have no (or a perverse) relationship to guilt and innocence.14
9. See, e.g., MICHAEL TONRY, THINKING ABOUT CRIME: SENSE AND
SENSIBILITY IN AMERICAN PENAL CULTURE 182 (2004) (pointing out that
“legislators have purposely transferred discretion from judges to prosecutors to
reduce chances that judges will mitigate sentences”).
10. See, e.g., infra note 94 and accompanying text (explaining how the
severity of criminal statutes, along with an overworked public defender system,
allows prosecutors to pressure defendants into pleading guilty).
11. See Ronald F. Wright, Trial Distortion and the End of Innocence in
Federal Criminal Justice, 154 U. PA. L. REV. 79, 90–91 (2005) (presenting data
that shows that the federal guilty plea rate was over 95% in 2002).
12. See, e.g., Joshua Dressler, The Wisdom and Morality of Present-Day
Criminal Sentencing, 38 AKRON L. REV. 853, 865 (2005) (“It is true that most
criminal defendants are guilty. But even [Alan Dershowitz] must be shocked, as
we all are, now that we have DNA, to realize how many times we have erred.”).
13. See Peter Neufeld & Barry Scheck, Commentary, in CONVICTED BY
JURIES, EXONERATED BY SCIENCE: CASE STUDIES IN THE USE OF DNA EVIDENCE TO
ESTABLISH INNOCENCE AFTER TRIAL, at XXVIII–XXXI (1996) (sexual assault cases).
14. See DONALD A. DRIPPS, ABOUT GUILT AND INNOCENCE 152–55 (2003)
[hereinafter DRIPPS, ABOUT GUILT AND INNOCENCE] (rejecting the incorporation of
the Fourth, Fifth, and Sixth Amendments and arguing that the “Court’s
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According to the accuracy narrative, Gideon’s focus on the Sixth
Amendment’s specific textual reference to “counsel” deflects
attention from the overall reliability of the proceedings, the
central focus of due process analysis.15
The punitive turn provided the ground for two further
narratives, a race-and-crime narrative based on the AfricanAmerican experience and an agency-costs narrative based on the
perspective of political economy. The fifth narrative emphasizes
the role of race in criminal justice, that the racially
disproportionate impact of discretionary drug enforcement,
mediated by coercive plea “offers” that effectively compel not just
guilty pleas, but false informant testimony, deprives the criminal
sanction of the legitimacy that is crucial to effective social
control.16 So too, in the sixth, the agency-costs narrative,
prosecutorial power has made the Warren Court landmarks
irrelevant.17 In response to coercive plea choices, typical
continued reliance on the basic incorporation framework needs to change before
the law can be made either more legitimate or more functional”); GEORGE C.
THOMAS III, THE SUPREME COURT ON TRIAL: HOW THE AMERICAN JUSTICE SYSTEM
SACRIFICES INNOCENT DEFENDANTS 12 (2008) (contending that the American
criminal justice system “often fails” innocent defendants).
15. See DRIPPS, ABOUT GUILT AND INNOCENCE, supra note 14, at 117–18
(“[B]y relying on the Sixth Amendment . . . the Warren Court deflected
attention from instrumental reliability in favor of a formalistic focus on the
textually referenced ‘assistance of counsel.’ . . . [B]ecause each defendant has
‘counsel’—no matter how overworked, inexperienced, lazy, or incompetent—the
constitutional minima appear to be satisfied.”).
16. See PAUL BUTLER, LET’S GET FREE: A HIP-HOP THEORY OF JUSTICE 233
(2009) (discussing that while African Americans “account for about 14 percent of
illegal drug users . . . they represent almost 56 percent of people who are
incarcerated for drug offenses”). For a rather more provocative comparison of
today’s criminal justice system with the post-bellum subordination of freed
slaves and their descendants in the Jim Crow South, see MICHELLE ALEXANDER,
THE NEW JIM CROW: MASS INCARCERATION IN THE AGE OF COLORBLINDNESS 2
(2010) (“As a criminal, you have scarcely more rights, and arguably less respect,
than a black man living in Alabama at the height of Jim Crow. We have not
ended racial caste in America; we have merely redesigned it.”).
17. William J. Stuntz, The Uneasy Relationship Between Criminal
Procedure and Criminal Justice, 107 YALE L.J. 1, 4 (1997) [hereinafter Stuntz,
Uneasy Relationship]
As courts have raised the cost of criminal investigation and
prosecution, legislatures have sought out devices to reduce those
costs. Severe limits on defense funding are the most obvious example,
but not the only one. Expanded criminal liability makes it easier for
the government to induce guilty pleas, as do high mandatory
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defendants waive the rights recognized by the Warren Court
landmarks.18 Those landmarks, on the agency-costs account, may
even have encouraged the turn to draconian sentences and
prosecutorial dominance.19
Finally, a seventh body of discordant scholarship offers
competing originalist narratives about constitutional criminal
procedure. The role of originalist methodology in some prominent
criminal procedure decisions,20 together with early work by Akhil
Amar,21 impelled both challenges to the theoretical premises of
originalism22 and a welter of contributions assessing historical
evidence about the Fourth, Fifth, and Sixth Amendments.23
Now, as with any body of thoughtful work about the same
phenomena, the various scholarly narratives agree on many
points. In particular, scholars writing from all perspectives agree
that even fifty years after Gideon, the representation of indigent
sentences that serve as useful threats against recalcitrant
defendants. And guilty pleas avoid most of the potentially costly
requirements that criminal procedure imposes.
18. See Robert K. Calhoun, Waiver of the Right to Appeal, 23 HASTINGS
CONST. L.Q. 127, 131 (1995) (explaining that the Supreme Court “has held that,
by entering a plea of guilty, a defendant forfeits a broad range of potential legal
and constitutional appellate claims that would otherwise have been available
had the case gone to trial”).
19. See Stuntz, Uneasy Relationship, supra note 17, at 4 (“These strategies
would no doubt be politically attractive anyway, but the law of criminal
procedure makes them more so.”).
20. See, e.g., Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 49, 68–69 (2004)
(reversing the defendant’s conviction after examining the Sixth Amendment’s
Confrontation Clause “upon the original understanding of the common-law
right” to confrontation).
21. AKHIL REED AMAR, THE CONSTITUTION AND CRIMINAL PROCEDURE: FIRST
PRINCIPLES 153 (1997) (“Textual argument is . . . a proper starting point for
proper constitutional analysis.”).
22. See, e.g., Louis Michael Seidman, Akhil Amar and the (Premature?)
Demise of Criminal Procedure Liberalism, 107 YALE L.J. 2281, 2292–93 (1998)
(book review) (“Unfortunately, however, Amar never explains exactly why we
should treat historical practice as important. The Framers’ world notoriously
was not our own, and the differences are nowhere more apparent than when
talking about issues of criminal procedure.” (footnote omitted)).
23. See, e.g., Thomas Y. Davies, Recovering the Original Fourth
Amendment, 98 MICH. L. REV. 547, 556 (1999) (presenting a detailed historical
examination of the Fourth Amendment and concluding, in part, that “we now
accord [police] officers far more discretionary authority than the Framers ever
intended or expected”).
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felony defendants in the state courts is generally inadequate. In
other words, there is a scholarly consensus that Gideon has
failed.
The traditional liberal narrative traces the parlous state of
indigent defense to the same conservative political trend that
supported the punitive turn. Richard Nixon’s four appointees to
the Court changed judicial ideology on criminal justice.24 On the
liberal account, the villain is not Gideon but the Burger Court’s
subsequent decision in Strickland v. Washington.25 An extensive
literature condemns Strickland for tolerating systemic conditions
that structurally preclude effective representation.26 Traditional
conservatives agree that indigent defense is in bad shape;27 their
clash with the liberals is what to do about it.
The liberal commentators offer various reform proposals, all
of which thus far have fallen on deaf judicial ears.28 The
traditional conservative position opposes reform imposed from
the top down by the Court in favor of leaving difficult decisions

24. See Ronald F. Wright, How the Supreme Court Delivers Fire and Ice to
State Criminal Justice, 59 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1429, 1439–40 (2002) (explaining
that Chief Justice Burger and President Nixon’s three other Supreme Court
appointees “changed the rules of habeas corpus to make it easier for federal
courts to avoid the merits of constitutional challenges”).
25. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984).
26. See, e.g., William S. Geimer, A Decade of Strickland’s Tin Horn:
Doctrinal and Practical Undermining of the Right to Counsel, 4 WM. & MARY
BILL RTS. J. 91, 93 (1995) (arguing that Strickland “effectively discarded” the
judgment in Gideon and that “the Court has effectively ensured that Gideon
guarantees little more than the presence of a person with a law license
alongside the accused during trial”).
27. See, e.g., Stephen J. Schulhofer & David D. Friedman, Reforming
Indigent Defense: How Free Market Principles Can Help to Fix a Broken System,
666 CATO INST. POL’Y ANALYSIS 1, 1 (2010), http://www.cato.org/sites/
cato.org/files/pubs/pdf/pa666.pdf (“Public defender offices around the country
face crushing caseloads that necessarily compromise the quality of the legal
representation they provide.”).
28. See, e.g., LAURENCE A. BENNER, AM. CONST. SOC’Y, WHEN EXCESSIVE
PUBLIC DEFENDER WORKLOADS VIOLATE THE SIXTH AMENDMENT RIGHT TO
COUNSEL WITHOUT A SHOWING OF PREJUDICE
2 (2011), http://
www.acslaw.org/files/BennerIB_ExcessivePD_Workloads.pdf;
Eve
Brensike
Primus, Structural Reform in Criminal Defense: Reallocating Ineffective
Assistance of Counsel Claims, 92 CORNELL L. REV. 679, 685 (2007) (proposing to
allow appellate lawyers to go outside the trial record when making ineffective
assistance of counsel claims).
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about funding priorities to elected legislatures.29 This returns
traditional liberals to process theory, reinforced by the race-andcrime narrative.
Given the critical contribution of defense counsel to the
reliability of convictions,30 the accuracy narrative endorses
29. I have not seen the separation-of-powers argument in the scholarly
literature, but it obviously weighs heavily with the judges who consistently have
rebuffed systemic challenges to indigent defense systems. For example, in
Madden v. Township of Delran, 601 A.2d 211, 222 (N.J. 1992), the court rejected
constitutional challenges to the practice of conscripting lawyers without
compensation, then closed its opinion as follows:
Our current system is unworthy of the traditions of this state. We
note that legislation proposed by the Law Revision Commission would
require every municipality to provide a public defender for the
municipal courts. We have no doubt that that is the ideal system, not
ideal in the sense of unrealistic but ideal in the sense of the best
system to meet the constitutional requirement. It is the most
efficient, the fairest, the most likely to achieve equal and effective
representation of indigent defendants at the least cost. It is a system
that should be instituted by other branches of government. We urge
them to act and trust they will. The victim in the present system is
not the bar, but the poor.
Id. at 222. The state courts agree that they have inherent power to order
funding for their own operation. See Michael L. Buenger, Of Money and Judicial
Independence: Can Inherent Powers Protect State Courts in Tough Financial
Times?, 92 KY. L.J. 979, 1035–36 (2003–2004) (noting that “many state courts”
believe “that the judiciary possesses inherent power as a function of being a
separate branch of government and that this power extends to compelling
necessary funding”). They also agree that compelling an appropriation to
preserve the existence of the judicial branch is an option of last resort, reserved
for extreme cases. See id. at 1041 (“The exercise of [a court’s] inherent powers to
compel funding must take place only under the most egregious of
circumstances . . . .”).
30. Many, perhaps most, Strickland violations are mediated by caseload
pressures. See, e.g., Richard Klein, The Eleventh Commandment: Thou Shalt not
be Compelled to Render the Ineffective Assistance of Counsel, 68 IND. L.J. 363,
409 (1993)
The ABA Bar Information Program of the Standing Committee on
Legal Aid and Indigent Defendants funded an analysis of a sample of
cases from 1970 to 1983 in which there had been findings of
ineffectiveness of counsel. This study revealed that perhaps 70% of
these cases could be identified as real or possible cases of “systemic
failure in adequacy of representation.” The analysis further found
that “a closer review of these cases reveals that the errors of counsel
were very frequently occasioned by a systemic impairment or
restraint which worked to unfairly inhibit or even nullify
representation by counsel, although counsel was ‘bodily’ in the
courtroom, totally apart from counsel’s personal skills or abilities.”
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Gideon albeit on the basis of due process rather than the Sixth
Amendment.31 The originalists, confronted by strong historical
evidence against Gideon, endorse Gideon either by surrendering
theoretical purity or by leaning on such thin reeds as history
offers.32 While they come by different routes to the premise of a
right to appointed counsel, both tend to agree with the liberal
narrative about the practical weakness of indigent defense.
The agency-costs narrative takes issue with the liberal
narrative’s version of process theory. Counter-majoritarian
rulings like Gideon change the incentives motivating police,
prosecutors, lower court judges, state legislatures, and
Congress.33 Procedural advantages for the defense can be offset,
via plea bargaining, if prosecutors over-charge or legislatures
adopt mandatory minimum sentences.34 The punitive turn thus
effectively nullified the Warren Court’s attempt to make the
criminal process less unfair and more reliable. Indeed, the
Warren Court’s ruling arguably contributed to the punitive
turn.35
(footnotes omitted).
31. See DRIPPS, ABOUT GUILT AND INNOCENCE, supra note 14, at 178–80
(criticizing Strickland for diluting the meaning of effective assistance of counsel,
and calling for a change of focus to the overall fairness of the trial process under
due process).
32. For example, Justice Scalia has not called for overruling Gideon, even
though his originalist dissent in Padilla v. Kentucky, 130 S. Ct. 1473 (2010),
“implicitly questioned whether even Gideon and Strickland were right.”
Stephanos Bibas, Regulating the Plea-Bargaining Market: From Caveat Emptor
to Consumer Protection, 99 CAL. L. REV. 1117, 1148 (2011); see also Padilla, 130
S. Ct. at 1495 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (rejecting the majority’s reasoning, “[e]ven
assuming the validity of” Gideon and Strickland, and reminding the Court that
“[w]e have until today at least retained the Sixth Amendment’s textual
limitation to criminal prosecutions”). AMAR, supra note 21, at 140, relies on
“structural arguments” to trump countervailing evidence such as the first
federal criminal code’s provision for appointing counsel only in capital cases. See
Crimes Act of 1790, ch. 9, 1 Stat. 112, 118 (authorizing appointment of counsel
for capital defendants).
33. See Barry Friedman, The Birth of an Academic Obsession: The History
of the Countermajoritarian Difficulty, Part Five, 112 YALE L.J. 153, 210–15
(2002) (describing the public and political response to the Warren Court’s
counter-majoritarian criminal procedure decisions, including Gideon).
34. See Stuntz, Uneasy Relationships, supra note 17, at 5, 55 (clarifying
how severe minimum sentences and “overbroad criminal statutes” help
prosecutors pressure defendants into pleading out).
35. See Friedman, supra note 33, at 214–15 (describing the public backlash
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On this view, the punitive turn made the right to counsel a
sideshow. Because the prosecutor’s last best offer is practically
coercive, counsel’s role is “meet ‘em, greet ‘em and plead ‘em.”36
Yet this has not led to calls for overruling Gideon.37 Instead, the
most prominent proposals call for rolling back the punitive turn
by limiting prosecutorial charging power and the severity of
prison sentences.38 The system would still be adversarial, rather
than inquisitorial, with a continuing role for appointed counsel.
My thesis derives from this overlapping consensus of
scholarly opinion. This Article argues that Gideon’s failure was
not just determined, but over-determined. Regardless of whether
Gideon’s holding is properly grounded on originalism, due
process, or the evolution of precedents, the punitive turn would
have neutralized the adversary system. Even if the federal courts
had steered a true course against prevailing political incentives,
and held the conviction of the guilty hostage to the demand for
effective public defender systems, well-funded defense systems
would still confront effectively coercive prosecutorial discretion.
The reverse is also true. If the federal courts had imposed
decent restraints on prosecutorial power and sentencing severity,
inadequate support for indigent defense would have left most
defendants, guilty and innocent alike, in no position to make good
use of a genuine option to stand trial. Gideon failed because of
both the political incentives noted by liberal process theorists and

against the Warren Court as crime rates rose in the 1960s, and how Richard
Nixon’s timely presidential victory allowed him to place two conservative
justices on the Supreme Court). Friedman explained that Chief Justice Burger
shared President Nixon’s disagreement with the Warren Court’s criminal
procedure decisions. Id. at 215.
36. Deborah L. Rhode, Access to Justice, 69 FORDHAM L. REV. 1785, 1793
(2001) (citing Alan Berlow, Requiem for a Public Defender, AM. PROSPECT, June
5, 2000, at 28).
37. See Abe Krash, Commentary, Conference on the 30th Anniversary of the
United States Supreme Court’s Decision in Gideon v. Wainwright: Gideon and
the Public Service Role of Lawyers in Advancing Equal Justice, 43 AM. U. L. REV.
1, 27 (1993) (“[C]ritics have urged the Supreme Court to limit or to overrule
various decisions of the 1950s and the 1960s with respect to the rights of
accused persons, but no responsible voice—no responsible voice—is heard today
urging that the Gideon decision should be overruled.”).
38. See infra notes 103–06 and accompanying text (describing reform
proposals).
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the substance-procedure feedback loop noted in the agency-costs
account.
The accuracy and race-and-crime critics are also right about
Gideon. While doctrinal form certainly did not determine
Gideon’s failure, the judiciary’s focus on the Bill of Rights, a
charter preoccupied with procedure rather than substance, made
it harder for the courts to come to grips with the substanceprocedure feedback loop.39 Even without grotesque racial
disparities, political incentives and the punitive turn probably
would have crippled the right to counsel. Nonetheless, draconian
yet discretionary supply-side drug enforcement gave the punitive
turn a major impetus.40 The distribution of drug enforcement’s
pain on racial minorities made that pain politically more
sustainable than it should have been.41
Part II of this Article briefly summarizes the Supreme
Court’s doctrine respecting the right to appointed counsel. Part II
then, again briefly, summarizes the prevailing state of indigent
defense. Part III then considers Gideon’s manifest failure from
the standpoint of the scholarly literature, focusing on the liberal
and agency-costs narratives. Illuminatingly, each of these
perspectives locates a distinct weakness in Gideon’s project.
Part IV then develops two thought-experiments. In the first,
the Supreme Court, rather than retreating from Gideon in
Strickland and subsequent cases, vigorously insisted on effective
representation for indigent defendants. What would have
happened? If nothing else changed, the punitive turn in
substantive law would still have vested prosecutors with the
power to make functionally coercive, outcome-determinative plea
“offers.” Even well-prepared defense lawyers would have little
choice but to advise even clients plausibly claiming factual
innocence to plead out.
In the second thought-experiment, the Supreme Court
decided Strickland just as it appears in the U.S. Reports.
Prosecutorial power and excessive sentences, however, are
curtailed by the menu of reforms put forward by Professor
39. See supra notes 14–15 and accompanying text (neglect of due process).
40. See supra note 16 and accompanying text (discretionary drug
enforcement).
41. See id. (same).
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Stuntz—minus his proposal for invigorating indigent defense. In
this experiment, typical defendants could dare to stand trial
without risking catastrophic penalties. Holding right-to-counsel
law constant, however, would mean that legislative neglect of the
defense function would give defendants electing trial poor
prospects for winning. Those prospects, moreover, would decline
as an increasing percentage of defendants elected trial in the
absence of catastrophic trial penalties.
Part V confronts the implications of Part IV. For Gideon to
succeed, there must be both a commitment of resources to the
defense function and effective regulation of the plea bargaining
process. For liberals this makes a case for another top-down
Criminal Procedure Revolution orchestrated by the Supreme
Court. For skeptics who find the bloom long since off the rose of
judicial activism, the logical alternative to despair is exploration
of institutional arrangements that promise at least some hope of
offering all defendants a fair trial, despite the prevailing politics
of crime and justice. As with the general consistency of the
critiques the various perspectives support, so too with the
directions for reform. Liberals may not expect much from
legislatures just as political economists doubt the prospects for
truly counter-majoritarian judicial intervention. Both camps
should be happy to see their expectations falsified.
II. Gideon’s Failure
A. The Impact of Gideon
Johnson v. Zerbst,42 decided twenty-five years before Gideon,
held that the “Sixth Amendment withholds from federal courts, in
all criminal proceedings, the power and authority to deprive an
accused of his life or liberty unless he has or waives the
assistance of counsel.”43 The right of indigent defendants to
appointed counsel in all felony cases, however, did not apply to
prosecutions in state courts. Under Betts v. Brady,44 Fourteenth
Amendment due process required appointing counsel for indigent
42.
43.
44.

Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458 (1938).
Id. at 463 (footnote omitted).
Betts v. Brady, 316 U.S. 455 (1942).
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defendants only when the totality of the circumstances of any
given case made denial of counsel fundamentally unfair.45 Gideon
overruled Betts and incorporated the Sixth Amendment rule of
Zerbst into Fourteenth Amendment due process.46
Gideon did not appear revolutionary. By 1963, only a few
states, concentrated in the south, did not appoint counsel for all
felony defendants.47 Outside of those states, Gideon did not
require dramatic changes. By contrast, the ruling two years
before in Mapp v. Ohio48 had imposed the exclusionary rule on
roughly half the states, including cosmopolitan northern
jurisdictions like New York and Massachusetts.49 The ruling
three years later in Miranda50 imposed a novel interrogation
procedure on all fifty states.51 Justice Harlan dissented in Mapp
and Miranda but concurred in Gideon.52
Nonetheless the new federal right to counsel in state cases at
least potentially promised nationwide systemic reforms. Even
under the due process test, the mere fact that a licensed attorney
was assigned to represent the accused did not automatically
satisfy the right to counsel. In Powell v. Alabama53 the Court
treated appointment of counsel on the day of trial as a
45. See id. at 473 (concluding that the Fourteenth Amendment does not
mandate assistance of counsel in every criminal case).
46. Gideon v Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 339 (1963) (overruling Betts).
47. See Jerold H. Israel, Gideon v. Wainwright: The “Art” of Overruling,
1963 SUP. CT. REV. 211, 267 (noting that, prior to Gideon, “thirty-eight states
ha[d] legal provisions requiring the appointment of counsel in such cases, and
seven more almost invariably follow[ed] that procedure as a matter of practice”
(footnotes omitted)); Brief for Petitioner at 30, Gideon, 372 U.S. 335 (No. 155)
(“There remain only five states—Alabama, Florida, Mississippi, North Carolina,
and South Carolina—which do not make provision for appointment of counsel in
behalf of indigents in all felony cases.”).
48. Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
49. Id. at 655, 660 (applying the Fourteenth Amendment’s exclusionary
rule to the states and invalidating a state criminal conviction based on an
unconstitutional search of Mapp’s home).
50. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
51. See id. at 478–79 (outlining the procedural safeguards required to
protect the suspect’s privilege against self-incrimination).
52. See, e.g., id. at 504 (Harlan, J., dissenting) (“I believe the decision of the
Court represents poor constitutional law and entails harmful consequences for
the country at large.”).
53. Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45 (1932).
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constructive denial of counsel altogether.54 In federal cases after
Zerbst, the courts of appeal had developed a test for the adequacy
of appointed counsel cribbed from the due process cases. If
counsel’s performance made the trial fundamentally unfair—“a
farce and mockery” of justice—then the appointment failed to
satisfy Zerbst.55
So Gideon made the quality of indigent defense a federal
question. While almost all states appointed counsel for indigent
felony defendants, the quality of indigent defense was widely
seen as dubious. For example, Alabama argued in Gideon that
the defense bar was so bad that typical defendants were really
better off without such advocates:
Many observers of the criminal trial scene are of the opinion
that today only a few lawyers who undertake criminal defense
cases are equal matches for career prosecutors whose intimate
familiarity with a wide variety of criminal charges and
prosecution techniques makes them formidable adversaries.
This demonstrates that, generally speaking, indigent persons
charged with crime are not as unfortunately situated as critics
of the Betts v. Brady rule would have us believe.56

Doubts about the effectiveness of criminal defense were by no
means confined to the South. According to Norman Lefstein:
The quality of representation in the 1960s was indescribable
compared to what it is today. We are light-years ahead of
where we were. I began in the fall of 1963 doing criminal
defense representation in the old D.C. Court of General
Sessions as part of Georgetown’s Prettyman Fellowship
program. Having lawyers intoxicated in the courtroom was not
uncommon. I’d see lawyers drinking in the men’s room and
encounter empty liquor bottles strewn around. I have a
distinct memory of a lawyer interviewing a client in the cell
block, right before a court appearance. After talking to the
client, the lawyer announced to the other lawyers in the cell
54. See id. at 71 (calling the late appointment of counsel in a capital case a
“clear denial of due process”).
55. See Diggs v. Welch, 148 F.2d 667, 668–69 (D.C. Cir. 1945) (writing that
the Sixth Amendment requires a showing that “the proceedings were a farce
and a mockery of justice” in order to grant habeas corpus relief). The Court of
Appeals emphasized that “to justify habeas corpus on that ground an extreme
case must be disclosed.” Id. at 669.
56. Brief for State of Alabama as Amici Curiae Supporting Respondent at
10, Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963) (No. 155).

WHY GIDEON FAILED

897

block, without shame or embarrassment, that “my client has
no money so I am going to plead him right away.”57

In 1973, the National Legal Aid and Defender Association
reported a nationwide study based on both questionnaires and
site inspections. The study found that
the resources allocated to indigent defense services have been
found grossly deficient in light of the needs of adequate and
effective representation. Relatively few indigent defendants
have the benefit of investigation and other expert assistance in
their
defense.
Their
advocates
are
overburdened,
undertrained, and underpaid, and as recent studies have
shown, the poor have as little confidence in such advocates,
who are often hand-picked by the same authority which
pronounces their sentence, as they do in the inherent fairness
of the American criminal justice system.58

Even in federal courts, in which Johnson v. Zerbst had been
the law since 1938, the quality of defense representation was less
than excellent. Judge David Bazelon declared that “a great many
‘if not most’ indigent defendants do not receive the effective
assistance of counsel guaranteed them by the 6th Amendment.”59
Bazelon had “often been told that if my court were to reverse
every case in which there was inadequate counsel, we would have
to send back half the convictions in my jurisdiction.”60
In the immediate aftermath of Gideon, two other
developments put new strains on the already struggling systems
of indigent defense. First, in Douglas v. California,61 a companion
case to Gideon, the Court held that the Equal Protection Clause
required appointing appellate counsel for the indigent at the first
appeal-as-of-right.62 In 1967, In re Gault63 extended the Gideon
57. See Malia Brink, An Interview with Norman Lefstein, 30 CHAMPION 38,
38 (2006).
58. NORMAN LEFSTEIN, CRIMINAL DEFENSE SERVICES FOR THE POOR 14 (1982)
(quoting NAT’L LEGAL AID & DEFENDER ASS’N, THE OTHER FACE OF JUSTICE 70
(1973)).
59. David L. Bazelon, The Defective Assistance of Counsel, 42 U. CIN. L.
REV. 1, 2 (1973) (footnote omitted).
60. Id. at 22–23.
61. Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353 (1963).
62. See id. at 358 (describing a state’s denial of court-appointed counsel on
appeal as a “meaningless ritual”).
63. In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967).
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rule to juvenile delinquency adjudications.64 Coupled with other
decisions extending the right to counsel, the practical
consequence was to increase the demand for indigent defense
representation in many jurisdictions that were appointing trial
counsel before Gideon.65
Second, during the 1960s and 1970s, crime rates went up.
“From 1961 to 1974, murder rates nearly doubled and robbery
rates more than tripled.”66 With more offenses came more
prosecutions.67
The systems that had struggled to handle pre-Gideon
caseloads saw those caseloads increase dramatically. According to
Professor Stuntz:
Criminal defense has been treated both more and less
generously. Budgets in the early 1970s saw enormous
percentage increases, but from a very low baseline. By the late
1970s, the increases had slowed considerably. Total spending
on indigent defense rose slightly more than 60% in constant
dollars between 1979 and 1990; state and local spending on
indigents roughly doubled. Meanwhile, the percentage of cases
in which defendants were given appointed counsel was also
rising, from just under half in the late 1970s and early 1980s
to 80% by 1992. And the total number of criminal cases was
rising as well: State court felony filings more than doubled
between 1978 and 1990. Thus, notwithstanding nominal
budget increases, spending on indigent defendants in constant

64. See id. at 73 (stating that the application of Gideon “must include with
special force those who are commonly inexperienced and immature”).
65. See, e.g., Suzanne E. Mounts, Public Defender Programs, Professional
Responsibility, and Competent Representation, 1982 WIS. L. REV. 473, 477
(“Clearly, the combined effect, in terms of the legal personnel required to fulfill
the promise made in these decisions, is enormous. This increase in the demand
for criminal defense attorneys has had substantial impact on the systems used
to provide defense services.”).
66. Gary LaFree, Explaining the Crime Bust of the 1990s, 91 J. CRIM. L. &
CRIMINOLOGY 269, 270 (2000) (reviewing ALFRED BLUMSTEIN & JOEL WALLMAN,
THE CRIME DROP IN AMERICA (2000)) (footnote omitted).
67. See William J. Stuntz, The Pathological Politics of Criminal Law, 100
MICH. L. REV. 505, 536 nn.126–28 (2001) [hereinafter Stuntz, Pathological
Politics] (explaining that by the late 1970s, state court felony prosecutions had
increased by 36%, much faster than the growth in crime rate and prosecutorial
staffing).
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dollars per case appears to have declined significantly between
the late 1970s and the early 1990s.68

If the Supreme Court had adopted a robust standard of effective
assistance, legislatures would have faced a forced choice between
allocating dramatically more resources to indigent defense and
scaling back the number of felony prosecutions.
Judge Bazelon, for example, proposed setting a required list
of specific duties, prominently including a duty to investigate,
coupled with a presumption of prejudice from the neglect of any
required duty.69 Bazelon’s own estimate that this would require
reversing half the convictions coming to the appellate courts is a
measure of just how revolutionary Gideon might have been.70 So
a great deal depended on how the Supreme Court ultimately
defined the minimum standard of effective assistance.
Instead, in Strickland v. Washington the Supreme Court
adopted the now notorious two-pronged test of ineffective
assistance. On appeal, the defense must show that counsel acted
outside the range of professional competence and that counsel’s
errors prejudiced the accused.71 Strickland has been the subject
of sustained academic criticism since it came down.72 We turn
now to exploring just why the state of indigent defense remains
in crisis after almost thirty years under Strickland.
68. Stuntz, Uneasy Relationship, supra note 17, at 9–10 (footnotes
omitted).
69. United States v. DeCoster (DeCoster III), 624 F.2d 196, 275 (D.C. Cir.
1976) (en banc) (Bazelon, J., dissenting) (“That upon showing a substantial
violation of any of counsel’s specified duties, a defendant establishes that he has
been denied effective representation and the burden shifts to the government to
demonstrate that the violation did not prejudice the defendant.”).
70. Supra note 59 and accompanying text.
71. See id. at 694 (“The defendant must show that there is a reasonable
probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the
proceeding would have been different.”).
72. See generally DRIPPS, ABOUT GUILT AND INNOCENCE, supra note 14, at
179 (“The worse the pretrial investigation was, the harder it is to prove that the
investigation prejudiced the defendant”); Geimer, supra note 26, at 93 (arguing
that Strickland “effectively disgraced” the judgment in Gideon); Bruce A. Green,
Lethal Fiction: The Meaning of “Counsel” in the Sixth Amendment, 78 IOWA L.
REV. 433, 503 (1993) (“[T]he Strickland standard affords no relief in cases where
unqualified defense counsel provides poor representation in every respect, but
commits no single egregious error that, standing alone, cannot be explained as a
reasonable strategic option.”).
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B. The Current State of Indigent Defense

I have previously remarked on the paradox of Gideon: it is
generally agreed that Gideon was a great decision, yet it is also
generally agreed that Gideon was not required by text and
history and has not led to effective representation of typical
indigent defendants.73 Gideon indeed makes a great story.
“Clarence Gideon’s journey to the Supreme Court of the United
States was a piece of storybook Americana—the luckless
drifter . . . the least of men, could appeal to the highest, the most
august court of the land. And once there, not only would he be
heard, but he would triumph.”74
Gideon’s “triumph” is indeed “storybook”—an unrealized
dream, a myth. Attorney General Eric Holder reported common
knowledge in 2010:
As we all know, public defender programs are too many times
under-funded. Too often, defenders carry huge caseloads that
make it difficult, if not impossible, for them to fulfill their legal
and ethical responsibilities to their clients. Lawyers buried
under these caseloads often can’t interview their clients
properly, file appropriate motions, conduct fact investigations,
or spare the time needed to ask and apply for additional grant
funding.75

General Holder’s view is shared by the overwhelming weight of
scholarly opinion.76
73. Donald A. Dripps, Up from Gideon, TEXAS TECH L. REV. (forthcoming
2013) (manuscript at 2), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2120782.
74. ED CRAY, CHIEF JUSTICE: A BIOGRAPHY OF EARL WARREN 405 (1997).
75. Eric Holder, U.S. Att’y Gen., Address at the Department of Justice
National Symposium on Indigent Defense: Looking Back, Looking Forward,
2000–2010 (Feb. 18, 2010) http://www.justice.gov/ag/speeches/2010/ag-speech100218.html, (last visited Apr. 2, 2013) (on file with the Washington and Lee
Law Review).
76. See, e.g., Gideon’s Promise Unfulfilled, supra note 6, at 2063–64
Although analysts of the criminal justice system may disagree about
the best solution to the problems facing indigent defense, there is
broad consensus that criminal defense systems are in “a state of
perpetual crisis.” As two commentators recently noted, “[t]he grave
inadequacy of existing systems for serving the indigent is widely
acknowledged and widely discussed.” In fact, since the 1963 Gideon
decision, a major independent report has been issued at least every
five years documenting the severe deficiencies in indigent defense
services.
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The ABA Standards recommend a maximum annual caseload
of 150 felonies or 400 misdemeanors per attorney,77 but most
defendants are prosecuted in jurisdictions that are over those
numbers, many dramatically over. Using the ABA Standards as
the benchmark, the Bureau of Justice Statistics reports that:
Twenty-seven percent of county-based public defender offices
reported sufficient numbers of litigating attorneys to handle
the cases received in those offices in 2007. About a quarter
(23%) of all offices reported less than half of the number of
litigating attorneys required to meet the professional
guidelines for the number of cases received in 2007.78

“The huddled masses in holding pens will be surprised to learn
that they are ‘equal before the law.’ Indigent defendants are
lucky to have a warm body and even a few minutes to discuss
their case with that warm body.”79

(footnotes omitted).
77. See AM. BAR ASS’N, STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE: PROVIDING
DEFENSE SERVICES § 5-5.3 cmt. (3d ed. 1992)
The standards of the National Advisory Commission, first developed
in 1973, have proven resilient over time, and provide a rough
measure of caseloads. They recommend that an attorney handle no
more than the following number of cases in each category each year:
150 felonies per attorney per year; or
400 misdemeanors per attorney per year; or
200 juvenile cases per attorney per year; or
200 mental commitment cases per attorney per year; or
25 appeals per attorney per year.
(footnote omitted).
78. BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, PUB. NO. NCJ
231175, COUNTY-BASED AND LOCAL PUBLIC DEFENDER OFFICES, 2007, at 10
(2010), http://bjs.ojp.usdoj.gov/content/pub/pdf/clpdo07.pdf. It should be noted
that a focus on the number of offices probably understates the scope of the
problem, since the urban offices that handle the most cases are also the most
likely to be overstretched.
79. THOMAS, supra note 14, at 21.
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III. Leading Academic Critiques of the Court’s Right-to-Counsel
Jurisprudence
A. The Liberal Narrative
The basic liberal narrative about constitutional criminal
procedure celebrates the Warren Court’s project of reforming the
criminal process to advance liberty and equality, and condemns
the Supreme Court’s pro-prosecution turn in the years since
Warren’s retirement in 1969.80 In the right to counsel context, the
liberal narrative celebrates Gideon and condemns Strickland.81
Liberal commentators follow Justice Marshall’s Strickland
dissent by criticizing both the performance prong of the test and
the prejudice prong.82 The performance prong is too vague to
guide defense counsel or lower courts, and the presumption of
competence serves to mask what in many cases are not “tactical
choices” but simple blunders.83 The prejudice prong insulates
even failures of the performance prong from reversal; the
defendant saddled with a record made by an ineffective advocate
must rely on that very record to prove the probable consequences
of the misrepresentation.84
80. See supra notes 3–4 and accompanying text (describing liberal support
for the Warren Court’s criminal justice decisions).
81. See, e.g., Geimer, supra note 26, at 93 (criticizing Strickland and the
Burger Court).
82. See Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 707 (1984) (Marshall, J.,
dissenting) (expressing disagreement with both the performance and prejudice
prongs adopted by the Court).
83. See, e.g., Vivian O. Berger, The Supreme Court and Defense Counsel:
Old Roads, New Paths—A Dead End?, 86 COLUM. L. REV. 9, 82 (1986) (arguing
that Justice O’Connor’s concerns about handcuffing defense counsel are
unpersuasive and “[a]ppropriately rigorous professional standards for
appraising counsel’s conduct should not discourage the type of attorney one
wants to attract from accepting in forma pauperis assignments”); Meredith
Duncan, The (So-Called) Liability of Criminal Defense Attorneys: A System in
Need of Reform, 2002 BYU L. REV. 1, 21–24 (criticizing the presumption of
competence); Green, supra note 72, at 502 (“Relying on the factually
unwarranted but legally mandated presumption [of competence], courts
frequently reject ineffective assistance claims premised on defense counsel’s
failure to present a case at the sentencing proceeding or even to investigate the
possibility of a defense.” (footnote omitted)).
84. See Geimer, supra note 26, at 93 (writing that Strickland and
subsequent Supreme Court jurisprudence has “undermined, if not virtually
destroyed, the right of indigent accused to have counsel do the kind of things . . .
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Strickland therefore undermines Gideon. Legislatures
disinclined to fund indigent defense know that the failure to
provide effective representation will lead to the reversal of few if
any convictions.85 Given liberal process theory’s skepticism about
legislative incentives in the criminal justice field, the Supreme
Court ought to revisit Strickland and replace it with at least
some concrete duties, linked to a presumption of prejudice when
counsel neglected the required duties.86 In the alternative, the
Court should approve institutional-reform litigation aimed at
ensuring qualified attorneys and limiting defender caseloads.87
B. The Agency-Costs Narrative
The liberal narrative endorses judicial intervention to
compensate for defects in legislative incentives respecting the
criminal process.88 The agency-costs narrative initiated by Judge
Easterbrook89 and brilliantly elaborated by Professor Stuntz,90
takes process theory further by asking how the other actors in the
system respond to judicial rulings on criminal procedure.91 The
that an attorney should reasonably be expected to do”).
85. See Berger, supra note 83, at 71 (comparing the possibility of “reversal
on the ground of attorney inadequacy” to “the camel’s proverbial path through
the eye of a needle”).
86. See, e.g., Benner, supra note 28, at 2 (proposing appeal strategy that
focuses “on the absence of counsel at a critical stage of the proceedings, rather
than the ineffectiveness of counsel’s conduct”); Geimer, supra note 26, at 168–72
(proposing a checklist of “Minimal Duties of Capital Defense Counsel,” and
adding that a judicial finding that these duties have been violated “should shift
the burden of proving absence of prejudice to the government”).
87. See Donald A. Dripps, Ineffective Assistance of Counsel: The Case for an
Ex Ante Parity Standard, 88 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 242, 264 (1997)
(outlining factors courts should consider prior to trial in examining a defense
lawyer’s ability to represent a client); Gideon’s Promise Unfulfilled, supra note
6, at 2070–72 (discussing advantages of litigated reform of indigent defense,
including establishing ex ante standards to evaluate effective assistance of
counsel).
88. See supra note 5 and accompanying text (calling for an active judicial
role).
89. Frank H. Easterbrook, Criminal Procedure as a Market System, 12 J.
LEGAL STUD. 289 (1983).
90. See generally Stuntz, Uneasy Relationship, supra note 17.
91. See Easterbrook, supra note 89, at 290 (comparing criminal procedure
to a market with scarce resources in which interactions among judges,
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essence of the agency-costs critique is that while the Court has
constitutionalized
criminal
procedure,
it
has
not
constitutionalized the rest of the system.92 In consequence,
procedural rulings set in motion unforeseen consequences, as
prosecutors, defense lawyers, and legislatures reacted to the new
incentive structure.93
Legislatures may not overrule the Court’s constitutional
rulings about criminal procedure. Current constitutional law,
however, leaves legislatures free to underfund indigent defense94
and to increase both the scope and the severity of the substantive
criminal law.95 Strickland imposes only an indefinite duty to
investigate,96 while the bulk of the Warren Court revolution
prosecutors, and defendants “tend to attain . . . the maximum deterrent punch”).
92. See Stuntz, Uneasy Relationship, supra note 17, at 6
(“Constitutionalizing procedure . . . may tend to encourage bad substantive law
and underfunding . . . . It may be that . . . courts have been not too activist, but
activist in the wrong places.”).
93. See, e.g., id. at 56, 59 (explaining that “criminal procedure . . . may give
defense counsel more arguments to raise . . . but at the cost of also giving them
less time and money to work with,” adding that “every pro-defense procedural
rule raises the gain to the government from overcriminalization”).
94. See id. at 4
Countermajoritarian criminal procedure tends to encourage
legislatures to pass overbroad criminal statutes and to underfund
defense counsel. These actions in turn tend to mask the costs of
procedural rules, thereby encouraging courts to make more such
rules. That raises legislatures’ incentive to overcriminalize and
underfund. So the circle goes. This is a necessary consequence of a
system with extensive, judicially defined regulation of the criminal
process, coupled with extensive legislative authority over everything
else.
95. See Stuntz, The Pathological Politics of Criminal Law, supra note 67, at
538
Anything that broadens criminal liability adds to the range of cases
prosecutors can win. Likewise, broadening criminal liability makes it
easier, across a range of cases, to induce a guilty plea—precisely
because the prosecution is so likely to win if the case goes to trial.
And more prosecutorial victories at lower cost advances not only
prosecutors’ welfare, but legislators’ as well.
96. See Stuntz, Uneasy Relationship, supra note 17, at 70
If this constitutional regulation of defense counsel’s performance had
worked, it would have regulated funding indirectly. Sixth
Amendment law would force counsel to perform to a given level,
thereby forcing states to spend whatever it took to permit counsel to
perform to that level. But the regime failed. No one has yet figured

WHY GIDEON FAILED

905

imposed regulations on police and prosecutors that are largely
insensitive to factual guilt.97 Defense attorneys have an incentive
to shun the resource-intensive investigation into factual guilt in
favor of motions to exclude evidence.98 Prosecutors have an
incentive to overcharge to deter both suppression motions and the
exercise of the increasingly expensive (in terms of both resources
and the risk of losing the case) trial right.99
out a good mechanism for defining a reasonable level of
representation—more importantly, no one has figured out a way to
define a reasonable level of attorney investigation. The difficulty is
that some cases may call for almost no effort while others require a
lot; separating the categories is at least expensive, and at most
impossible. The law has responded by retreating to the model of the
discrete attorney error. Insufficient investigation is basically left
alone. The upshot is that Gideon, while not trivial, means vastly less
than it seems. Defendants receive counsel, but counsel must bear
caseloads that require them to start with a strong presumption
against any significant investment in any given case.
97. WILLIAM J. STUNTZ, THE COLLAPSE OF AMERICAN CRIMINAL JUSTICE 228
(2011) [hereinafter STUNTZ, COLLAPSE] (“Warren and his colleagues continued
and exacerbated a long-term trend: they proceduralized criminal litigation,
siphoning the time of attorneys and judges away from the question of the
defendant’s guilt or innocence and toward the process by which the defendant
was arrested, tried, and convicted.”).
98. See Stuntz, Pathological Politics, supra note 67, at 570 n.242
The law of criminal procedure creates a range of claims defendants
can raise at various points in the process, and those claims tend to be
cheaper to investigate and litigate than claims bearing on defendants’
factual guilt. Legislatures, meanwhile, fund appointed defense
counsel at levels that require an enormous amount of selectivity—
counsel can contest only a very small fraction of the cases on their
dockets, and can investigate only a small fraction of the claims their
clients might have. This effect applies to the mass of criminal
litigation, since roughly eighty percent of criminal defendants receive
appointed counsel. The consequence is to steer criminal litigation
away from the facts, and toward more cheaply raised constitutional
claims. Those claims tend not to correlate with innocence; or if they
do, the correlation may be perverse.
99. William J. Stuntz, The Political Economy of Criminal Justice, 119
HARV. L. REV. 780, 841 (2006) [hereinafter Stuntz, Political Economy]
Notice the incentives Bordenkircher creates. For prosecutors, the
message is: threaten everything in your arsenal in order to get the
plea bargain you want. For defendants, the message is simpler: take
the deal, or else. (The incentive to plead applies to innocent and
guilty defendants alike. Indeed, it may apply more strongly to
innocents, who are more risk averse than their guilty counterparts.)
(footnote omitted).
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The punitive turn, then, made the Warren Court’s
“revolution” a dud. Armed with sweeping statutory definitions of
guilt and draconian mandatory minimum sentences, prosecutors
became the dominant actors in the system. Plea bargaining went
from the resolution of most cases in the shadow of the law to the
resolution of almost all cases with very little practical legal
constraint.100 While Stuntz was sometimes equivocal, in places he
argues that the Warren Court bears some responsibility for the
punitive turn.101 By arming defendants with guilt-insensitive
procedural rights, the Court encouraged legislatures and
prosecutors to exploit the constitutionally unregulated parts of
the system: legislative power over budgets and statutory sentence
ranges, and prosecutor power over charge selection.
Stuntz proposed various reforms aimed at recalibrating the
relationship between the parts of the system regulated by
constitutional law and the parts left to legislative control or
executive discretion.102 These included more vigorous judicial
review of substantive criminal law under the due process clauses
judicially-mandated
and
the
Eighth
Amendment,103
appropriations for indigent defense,104 and requiring prosecutors
to prove that the charges against the accused were similar in
severity to the charges brought against other defendants who
engaged in similar conduct.105
100. See generally William J. Stuntz, Plea Bargaining and Criminal Law’s
Disappearing Shadow, 117 HARV. L. REV. 2548 (2004).
101. Compare STUNTZ, COLLAPSE, supra note 97, at 236 (“The law of criminal
procedure raised the cost of policing and prosecution when that cost was already
too high, and lowered it when the cost was already too low. The consequence
was to make both the punishment drop of the 1960s and the punishment rise of
the following three decades larger and more destructive.”), with id. at 241 (“The
Supreme Court was not responsible for all this.”); and id. at 242 (“But if the
Justices did not cause the backlash, they made a large contribution to it.”). In
Collapse, Stuntz focused more on the role of the Warren Court in prompting a
tough-on-crime political backlash generally rather than with the rational-actor
model elaborated in Uneasy Relationship, supra note 17. The two causal
mechanisms are not mutually inconsistent.
102. See, e.g., Stuntz, Uneasy Relationship, supra note 17, at 66–72.
103. See id. at 66–67 (proposing greater judicial control over interpretation
of law and sentencing).
104. See id. at 70–72 (arguing for funding requirements that would directly
address “serious and common injustices”).
105. Stuntz, Political Economy, supra note 99, at 840–41 (“For all sentences
over some minimum level—say, three or six months—prosecutors should be
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The liberal narrative’s version of process theory assumed, or
at any rate hoped, for a stable baseline of statutory law and
prosecutorial discretion.106 The agency-costs narrative points out
just how naive (at least in retrospect) the assumption was.107 We
turn now to consider how far these prevailing narratives diverge.
IV. Two Thought Experiments
We can compare the liberal and agency-cost narratives by
imagining that the key problems identified by each were
somehow solved. I shall argue that these thought experiments
suggest that Gideon failed because of both a lack of political will
and systemic changes that made standing trial an irrational
option for almost all defendants. Even if the Court compelled
legislatures to provide adequate resources to the defense
function, the effective performance of that function would do little
good to most defendants, including innocent ones. Even if the
system somehow curtailed prosecutorial discretion and legislative
sentencing excesses, defendants would not receive fair trials, or
make well-informed decisions to plead guilty, without the
commitment of major new resources for the defense function.
A. The First Experiment: Suppose the Supreme Court Compelled
Allocation of Adequate Resources for Indigent Defense
Commentators have offered several alternative reforms of
the Strickland standard.108 I leave aside the issue of which of
these alternatives offers the most legitimate and practical route
to improving indigent defense. The question I pose is, assuming
that ineffective-assistance doctrine somehow compelled the

required to show that sentences at least as severe have been imposed some
minimum number of times for the same crime on similar facts. Those limits
would make sentences less harsh and disparities smaller.”); id. at 841 (“Best of
all, such limits would also reduce prosecutors’ power in plea negotiations.”).
106. See supra Part III.A.
107. See supra notes 88–93 and accompanying text for an introduction to the
agency-costs narrative.
108. See supra notes 86–87 and accompanying text.
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allocation of major new resources to indigent defense, how much
difference would it make in the processing of typical cases?
We can base an answer on more than pure speculation.
Indigent defense in federal prosecutions is generally regarded as
in much better shape than in most of the states. In the federal
practice, most judicial districts now have a public defender office,
whether a creature of the Justice Department (“Federal Defender
Services”) or as an independent nonprofit legal services
corporation (“community defender organizations”).109 While
almost all districts now have a public defender office, conflicts of
interest among defendants require representation of a significant
number of defendants (roughly 40%) by private lawyers taking
individual cases on a fee-for-service basis (“panel attorneys”).110
Inga Parsons, who spent five years in the Federal Defender
Division of the New York Legal Aid Society, saw sharp contrasts
between that office and the Society’s Criminal Defense Division,
whose lawyers represented defendants in state court:
My friends who were lawyers with the same Legal Aid Society,
but defending state cases in the Criminal Defense Division
109. See JON WOOL, K. BABE HOWELL & LISA YEDID, IMPROVING PUBLIC
DEFENSE SYSTEMS: GOOD PRACTICES FOR FEDERAL PANEL ATTORNEY PROGRAMS 2
n.4 (2003)
Federal public defender organizations are offices of federal employees
of the judicial branch. Each office is headed by a federal public
defender who is appointed by the court of appeals for the circuit in
which the office is located and is subject to removal by the court for
incompetency, misconduct in office or neglect of duty. 18 U.S.C.
§ 3006A(g)(2)(A). Community defender organizations are nonprofit
legal service providers established and administered by groups
authorized by the district CJA plan. 18 U.S.C. § 3006A(g)(2)(B).
Unlike a federal public defender, a community defender operates
under a board of directors and is not employed by the federal
judiciary. A community defender may be funded by grants from the
Judicial Conference or through submission of vouchers on a case-bycase basis. 18 U.S.C. § 3006A(g)(2)(B)(i) and (ii).
110. See The Defender Services Program, U.S. COURTS, http://www.us
courts.gov/FederalCourts/AppointmentOfCounsel.aspx (last visited Apr. 2, 2013)
In those districts with a defender organization, panel attorneys are
typically assigned between 30 percent and 40 percent of the CJA
cases, generally those where a conflict of interest or some other factor
precludes federal defender representation. Nationwide, federal
defenders receive approximately 60 percent of CJA appointments,
and the remaining 40 percent are assigned to the CJA panel.
(on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
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(hereinafter “CDD”), would constantly complain about the
assembly line mentality of state courts, where lawyers are
expected to process, perfunctorily, outrageous caseloads—
sometimes carrying 300 misdemeanors at a time, or the
juggling of 100 felonies with 200 misdemeanors. These cases
are stacked in a bin in the courtroom, needing immediate
attention, with little time to conduct investigations or legal
analysis—much less to interview the client.
During these conversations I would think how lucky I was to
be in the federal system where the culture of lawyering was
based on traditional notions of adversarial advocacy and
manageable caseloads. I was supported by an energetic and
competent support staff, generous training and computer
services budget, access to talented and experienced trial
lawyers in-house, and pleasant and commodious office
facilities. Moreover, my salary was significantly higher than
that of staff attorneys at the CDD, and essentially on par with
my adversaries in the United States Attorney’s Office. In sum,
I felt that I was able to provide individualized adversarial
advocacy to each and every one of my clients with few cost
constraints.111

The reputation of the federal defender offices is generally high.112
There is some evidence that the panel attorneys are not as
well-regarded. The Vera Institute’s researchers found that,
within the federal criminal practice community, federal defenders
had a better reputation than panel attorneys.113 A 2007 study for
the National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER) found that
panel attorneys were not as effective as federal defenders.114
111. Inga L. Parsons, “Making it a Federal Case”: A Model for Indigent
Representation, 1997 ANN. SURV. AM. L. 837, 840 (footnote omitted).
112. See, e.g., WOOL ET AL., supra note 109, at 15 (“Without exception, the
people we interviewed had high opinions of community defenders and federal
public defenders.” (footnote omitted)).
113. See id. (“Everyone we spoke with said that attorneys in defender offices
provide at least slightly higher quality representation, on average, than do
panel attorneys.” (footnote omitted)).
114. Radha Iyengar, An Analysis of the Performance of Federal Indigent
Defense Counsel 28 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 13187,
2007), available at http://www.nber.org/papers/w13187 (“It appears that public
defenders outperform CJA panel attorneys in all outcomes that were
considered.”). For methodological objections, see Study Says Public Defenders Do
Better than CJA Attorneys, TALKLEFT (July 14, 2007, 11:15 AM),
http://www.talkleft.com/story/2007/7/14/2111/18099 (last visited Apr. 2, 2013)
(on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
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The NBER study attributed all the difference in outcomes to
“attorney experience, wages, law school quality and average
caseload”115—all at least partly functions of the compensation
paid to the panel attorneys. Since the NBER study, compensation
levels for panel attorneys have increased:
Today, panel attorneys are paid an hourly rate of $125 per
hour in non-capital cases, and, in capital cases, a maximum
rate of $178 per hour. These rates were implemented January
1, 2010, for work performed on or after that date. The rates
include both attorney compensation and office overhead. In
addition, there are case maximums that limit total panel
attorney compensation for categories of representation (for
example, $9,700 for felonies, $2,800 for misdemeanors, and
$6,900 for appeals). These maximums may be exceeded when
higher amounts are recommended by the district judge as
necessary to provide fair compensation and the chief judge of
the circuit approves.116

The arithmetic works out to seventy-seven fully compensable
hours for felony cases. Compared to the rates charged by elite
private firms, this is low indeed.117 Compared to the rates paid in
many states, it is quite generous.118
115. Iyengar, supra note 114, at 3.
116. The Defender Services Program, supra note 110.
117. See, e.g., Allen Abrahamson, Simpson Legal Fees Could Run into
Millions, L.A. TIMES, Jul. 9, 1994, at A1 (stating that top criminal defense
attorneys charge between $250 and $400 an hour).
118. See Darryl K. Brown, Epiphenomenal Indigent Defense, 75 MO. L. REV.
907, 912–13 (2010)
States vary widely with regard to funding levels, funding structures,
and stability for indigent defense. Hourly rates for appointed counsel
vary widely. For example, the rate is $40 per hour in Oregon,
Kentucky, and Wisconsin; $50 an hour in Vermont and Tennessee;
$60 an hour in South Carolina, Ohio, Oklahoma, New Hampshire,
and New Jersey; $90 an hour in Hawaii, Virginia, and California (for
some felonies in certain localities); and $100 an hour in Nevada and
Massachusetts (for homicide cases).
Caps on total fees vary greatly as well. For appointed counsel,
Virginia limits fees to $600 per case for less serious felonies and
$1,235 per case for more serious felonies (although courts can grant
increases up to $2,085). West Virginia has no maximum fee on lifeincarceration felonies and a $3,000 limit on all others. Vermont’s
limits are $25,000 for life felonies, $5,000 for other major felonies,
and $2,000 for lesser ones. Nevada’s fees are $20,000 for life-withoutparole felonies and $2,500 for all others. Mississippi’s fees are capped
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In a recent survey of judges, Richard Posner and Albert Yoon
found that: “Federal judges generally rate prosecutors as
comparable in quality to public defenders and significantly better
than court-appointed counsel or retained counsel. State judges
agree with respect to the high quality of prosecutors but hold
retained counsel in higher regard than public defenders or courtappointed counsel.”119 I am not suggesting the federal indigent
defense is perfect. It, does, however, appear to be dramatically
better than its state counterparts, and this difference appears to
be largely a function of better financial support. Has the relative
strength of the defense function really benefitted federal
defendants?
In the federal system, 97% of convictions result from guilty
pleas, an even higher rate than the astounding 94% that prevails
in the state systems.120 In federal cases, the average sentence is
46 months and the median sentence is 24 months.121 The gross
figures for the states are somewhat lower, but the great majority
of murder and rape prosecutions occur in the state systems.
Despite “three strikes laws,” the “sentences available in a federal
prosecution are generally higher than those available in state
court—often ten or even twenty times higher.”122
Professor Barkow puts it well:
In the 95% of cases that are not tried before a federal judge or
jury, there are currently no effective legal checks in place to
police the manner in which prosecutors exercise their
discretion to bring charges, to negotiate pleas, or to set their
office policies. In a national government whose hallmark is

at $1,000, plus overhead reimbursement at $25 an hour. Several
states have no per-case fee cap.
(footnotes omitted).
119. Richard A. Posner & Albert H. Yoon, What Judges Think of the Quality
of Legal Representation, 63 STAN. L. REV. 317, 320 (2011).
120. See Missouri v. Frye, 132 S. Ct. 1399, 1407 (2012) (stating that ninetyseven percent of federal convictions and ninety-four percent of state convictions
are obtained through guilty pleas).
121. U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, SOURCEBOOK OF FEDERAL SENTENCING
STATISTICS tbl.13 (2009).
122. Sara Sun Beale, Too Many and Yet Too Few: New Principles to Define
the Proper Limits for Federal Criminal Jurisdiction, 46 HASTINGS L.J. 979, 998
(1995).
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supposed to be the separation of powers, federal prosecutors
are a glaring and dangerous exception.123

This is strong language, but, in my view, justifiably strong.
Barkow sees the incentives and resources available to the
defense as precluding an effective check.124 As we have seen,
however, the defense function in federal cases is as strong as we
have any cause to expect from a public system. The prosecutor’s
coercive discretion makes a robust defense against the best
interests of the client.125 Indeed, Professor Stuntz, for one, saw
the ability of well-heeled white-collar defendants to hire first-rate
lawyers as contributing to the pathologies attending the punitive
turn. “Federal law and practice is where overcriminalization and
oversentencing seem most prevalent—and, not coincidentally,
that is also where defendants with resources are concentrated
(which makes overcriminalization especially useful from the
government’s perspective).”126
As Barkow notes, Congress “routinely passes laws with
punishments greater than the facts of the offense would demand
to allow prosecutors to use the excessive punishments as
bargaining chips and to obtain what prosecutors and Congress
would view as the more appropriate sentence via a plea instead of
a trial.”127 If the defense function became more robust,
prosecutors could respond by increasing the trial penalty. If
existing legislation does not provide enough prosecutorial
leverage (a rather improbable hypothesis), Congress could easily
supply it.
123. Rachel E. Barkow, Institutional Design and the Policing of Prosecutors:
Lessons from Administrative Law, 61 STAN. L. REV. 869, 871 (2009) (footnotes
omitted).
124. See id. at 881–82 (finding that prosecutors have significant financial
leverage over defendants and that defendants and their lawyers often have
“divergent interests when it comes to bargaining with prosecutors”).
125. Ron Wright has pointed out that guilty pleas have disproportionately
displaced acquittals relative to trial convictions and dismissals. See Ronald F.
Wright, Trial Distortion and the End of Innocence in Federal Criminal Justice,
154 U. PA. L. REV. 79, 104 (2005) (“[T]he acquittal slice of the pie in the federal
system has been shrinking more quickly than the slices for dismissals or trial
convictions. Acquittals now occupy a smaller portion of the non-plea outcomes
than at any time since the repeal of Prohibition.”). Even defendants with good
chances for acquittal are pleading guilty.
126. Stuntz, Uneasy Relationship, supra note 17, at 58.
127. See Barkow, supra note 123, at 880 (footnote omitted).
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Clearly, better representation can benefit individual clients.
In the prosecutor-dominated system of overcriminalization and
plenary discretion, however, good representation very often
means cooperating with the prosecution of suspected
confederates. From the standpoint of defendants as a class, the
benefits of flipping first (or holding out longest, an alternative
strategy) are fixed; it is a zero-sum game.
So let us indulge the hypothesis that, whether by judicial
rulings or legislative intervention, state systems of indigent
defense were brought up at least to the federal standard. We
would expect state prosecutors and state legislators to act like
federal prosecutors and Congress. Better support for indigent
defense would increase the risk of acquittal at trial, increasing
the incentive of prosecutors to secure a plea. Since constitutional
law leaves practically no check on charging decisions, prosecutors
could respond to better investigations by defense counsel by
increasing the gap between the consequences of plea and trial.
Since constitutional law leaves practically no check on sentence
severity, if state law did not permit prosecutors to ratchet up the
trial penalty, state legislatures could increase the bargaining
power of prosecutors. From the perspective of political economy,
the liberal story has no happy ending.
B. Suppose We Curtailed Sentencing Severity and Prosecutorial
Discretion
Now let us explore my second thought experiment. Suppose
that prosecutorial power to coerce guilty pleas by threatening
catastrophic trial consequences was curtailed. James Vorenberg
offered thoughtful proposals more than thirty years ago,128 and
the recent literature abounds with plausible ideas.129
128. See James Vorenberg, Decent Restraint of Prosecutorial Power, 94
HARV. L. REV. 1521, 1560–72 (1981) (proposing, among other things, fixed trial
penalty, prosecutorial guidelines, and judicial review of plea bargains).
129. See, e.g., Barkow, supra note 123, at 874
[Prosecutors] who make investigative and advocacy decisions should
be separated from those who make adjudicative decisions, the latter
of which should be defined to include some of the most important
prosecutorial decisions today, including charging, the acceptance of
pleas, and the decision whether or not to file substantial assistance
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The proposals of Professor Stuntz offer a good focus for the
experiment. Stuntz proposed (1) less severe sentencing
legislation;130 (2) one-way judicial sentencing discretion to impose
sentences below guideline recommendations;131 (3) disparity
review at sentencing imposing a burden on prosecutors “to show
that sentences at least as severe have been imposed some
minimum number of times for the same crime in the same state
on similar facts”;132 (4) judicial review of plea bargains such as
occurs in the military justice system where courts “review the
factual basis of guilty pleas with great care, and with little
deference to the pleas themselves”;133 and (5) that courts read
vague normative standards into the meaning of the substantive
criminal law.134
Now, Stuntz also proposed “ratcheting up” review of
ineffective assistance claims in jurisdictions that do not comply
with funding levels recommended by “expert commissions.”135
Standing alone, this proposal is no more than another clever
doctrinal move designed to advance the liberal narrative’s
concern for effective indigent defense. Its inclusion in Stuntz’s
reform package is a good indicator of how my thought
experiment—in which prosecutorial power is regulated but the
defense function is not improved—would likely turn out.
More robust guilty-plea procedures would impose new
demands on defense time as well. The burden might be modest in
individual cases, but pleas would remain more common by far
motions.
Stephanos Bibas, Prosecutorial Regulation Versus Prosecutorial Accountability,
157 U. PA. L. REV. 959, 964 (2009) (“Prosecutors’ offices should promulgate and
publish more procedural guidelines to structure their internal review of cases.”);
Angela J. Davis, The American Prosecutor: Independence, Power, and the Threat
of Tyranny, 86 IOWA. L. REV. 393, 460–64 (2001) (proposing “Public Information
Departments” and “Prosecution Review Boards”); Ronald F. Wright, Sentencing
Commissions as Provocateurs of Prosecutorial Self-Regulation, 105 COLUM. L.
REV. 1010, 1013 (2005) (proposing “self-regulation by prosecutors prompted by
[sentencing] commissions and loosely enforced by judges”).
130. STUNTZ, COLLAPSE, supra note 97, at 295.
131. Id.
132. Id. at 297.
133. Id. at 302–03 (footnote omitted).
134. Id. at 303–04.
135. Id. at 299.
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than trials. If the new system required a 25% increase in defense
time devoted to guilty pleas, and pleas accounted for 80% of
dispositions, the defense system would need a 20% increase in
resources simply to process the guilty pleas.
Curtailing the trial penalty would remove the biggest
incentive discouraging defendants from standing trial.
Converting guilty pleas into mini-trials would reduce the cost to
the prosecution of trial relative to plea. More trials would result.
If the guilty plea rate went down from 95% to 80%, the number of
trials would quadruple. The same indigent defense system that
now struggles simply to process guilty pleas would be called upon
to conduct these trials.
Unprepared lawyers would beg for continuances that would
lead to massive trial delays if granted and to seat-of-the-pants
defense at trial if denied. Innocent defendants would spend more
time in pretrial detention and have a greater risk of conviction at
trial. Ineffective assistance would become more common.
Quadrupling the trial rate without massive increases in defense
resources is close to unthinkable.
The first experiment suggests that improving indigent
defense without reining in sentence severity and prosecutorial
discretion would do little good. It might even do harm if
prosecutors respond to the heightened risks of losing trials by
increasing the trial penalty. The second experiment suggests that
reigning in sentences and discretion without dramatic
improvements in the defense function would likewise do little
good. Trials would be more common but poorly conducted by
overwhelmed defenders. If even a modest trial penalty survived
in the new regime, more than a few defendants would suffer that
penalty after trials that would have ended in acquittal given wellprepared defense counsel. In short, the compelling arguments for
reinforcing the defense function in the current system would
become far stronger in a system that relied more heavily on trials.
V. Three Reform Agendas
The agency-costs account establishes a central premise of
efforts to reform our criminal justice system. We must think of it
as a system in which court rulings, statutory changes, funding
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commitments, and discretionary enforcement decisions interact
with one another.
For liberals skeptical of constructive legislative intervention,
that calls for charting an interlocking set of constitutional rulings
designed to restore an adversary system—a system in which each
defendant has a genuine advocate and a genuine trial option. For
conservatives seeking a similar result through legislative
channels, the logical way to seek systemic reform through the
political process is to support the call for a new National
Commission on Crime and Justice. For pragmatists trying to
mitigate the worst features of the present system on the
assumption that the political will to do more is a distant prospect,
the rather depressing course is also clear. Pragmatists should
work to rationalize the defense function by looking for ways to
provide it at less cost and to ration what is available for
maximum benefit.
A. A Liberal Agenda: Planning for a Second Revolution
Positive
political
theorists136
and
progressive
137
constitutionalists doubt the chances for genuinely constructive
counter-majoritarian judicial review. Yet the widely held view
that the Court’s role in the criminal process is distinct from its
more general constitutional docket has considerable factual
foundations. For the most part, the early critics of the Warren
Court gave Mapp, Gideon, and Miranda a free pass.138 Those
decisions have not been overruled, although they have been
qualified by two generations of justices more conservative than
their authors. In Crawford v. Washington139 and Apprendi v.

136. See generally Robert A. Dahl, Decision-Making in a Democracy: The
Supreme Court as National Policymaker, 6 J. PUB. L. 279 (1957) (arguing
generally that the Court protects minority rights after a national consensus
emerges on behalf of those rights).
137. See generally MARK TUSHNET, TAKING THE CONSTITUTION AWAY FROM
THE COURTS (1999).
138. See, e.g., ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE SUPREME COURT AND THE IDEA OF
PROGRESS 49 (1970) (describing Miranda as “a radical, if justifiable, departure
from prior practice”).
139. Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36 (2004).
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New Jersey,140 the current Court has carried forward an active
role in regulating criminal procedure.141
The current structure of the constitutional jurisprudence, in
which the Court announces substantial Fourth, Fifth, and Sixth
Amendment limits on police, prosecutors, and courts, then leaves
those limits to be subverted by constitutionally unregulated plea
bargaining against the background of constitutionally
unregulated authorized sentences, was not inevitable. It was a
near-run thing, more near-run than the agency-costs account
invites us to suppose.
The key plea bargaining case, Bordenkircher v. Hayes,142 was
decided by the margin of five to four.143 All of the Eighth
Amendment cases upholding recidivism enhancements were fiveto-four decisions.144 In Grady v. Corbin,145 the Court majority
adopted (temporarily!) a transactional test of “same offense” in
the Double Jeopardy Clause, a doctrine that could have provided
the basis for a constitutional merger doctrine that could have
prevented charge stacking.146
With robust judicial scrutiny of trial penalties, a
constitutional merger rule, and a prohibition on sentences longer
than twenty-five years for crimes not involving immediate threat
to human life or sexual assault, prosecutorial power would have
140. Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000).
141. See Crawford, 541 U.S. at 68–69 (holding that an admission of
testimonial hearsay from an unavailable declarant violates the confrontation
clause absent an opportunity for the defendant to cross-examine the declarant);
Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 490 (holding that a mandatory sentencing enhancement
triggered by a specific factual finding by the sentencing judge violates the Sixth
Amendment right to a jury trial).
142. Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357 (1978).
143. See id. at 365 (Blackmun, J., joined by Justices Brennan and Marshall,
dissenting); id. at 368 (Powell, J., dissenting).
144. See Ewing v. California, 538 U.S. 11, 32 (2003) (Stevens, J., joined by
Justices Breyer, Ginsburg and Souter, dissenting); Harmelin v. Michigan, 501
U.S. 957, 1009 (1991) (White, J., joined by Justices Blackmun and Stevens,
dissenting); id. at 1027 (Marshall, J., dissenting); Rummel v. Estelle, 445 U.S.
263, 285 (1980) (Powell, J., joined by Justices Brennan, Marshall and Stevens,
dissenting). Justice Stewart joined the majority in Rummel only with expressed
distaste for the statute. See id. at 285 (Stewart, J., concurring).
145. Grady v. Corbin, 495 U.S. 508 (1990), overruled by United States v.
Dixon, 509 U.S. 688 (1993).
146. Id. at 516.
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remained considerable but not plenary. The liberal narrative
holds that the Supreme Court came close to adopting these
doctrines, but fell short, more from a policy preference for the
prosecution than from a shortage of plausible doctrinal
resources.
The Court’s recent Sixth Amendment decisions in Padilla,147
Frye,148 and Cooper149 break relatively modest doctrinal
ground.150 They may portend something far more momentous—a
majority willing to try to resuscitate the adversary system.
Justice Scalia, for one, seems to think that it would be “foolish
to think that ‘constitutional’ rules governing counsel’s behavior
will not be followed by rules governing the prosecution’s
behavior in the plea bargaining process.”151
The first shot in a new revolution would be a ruling that
effective assistance of counsel must be established affirmatively
at the plea colloquy.152 If the trial court refuses to enter a plea
absent a record of factual investigation and sound legal advice
by counsel, the present house of cards would collapse.
That turn actually would call forth major new resources for
indigent defense. As we have seen, however, a more vigorous
defense can do little but advise surrender in the face of
draconian potential penalties and prosecutorial power to impose
those penalties for the crime of standing trial. What liberal
147. Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356 (2010).
148. Missouri v. Frye, 132 S.Ct. 1789 (2012).
149. Lafler v. Cooper, 132 S. Ct. 1376 (2012).
150. See Frye, 132 S. Ct. at 1408 (holding that failure to communicate plea
offer to client was ineffective assistance); Lafler, 132 S. Ct. at 1384 (holding that
erroneous legal advice inducing defendant to reject a plea offer was ineffective
assistance); Padilla, 130 S. Ct. at 1482 (holding that a failure to advise a client
that a guilty plea might result in deportation was ineffective assistance of
counsel). In Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52 (1985), the Court held that erroneous
advice about the potential sentence could constitute ineffective assistance
entitling the defendant to withdraw a plea. Id. at 56–57. Padilla, Frye, and
Cooper involved attacks on trial convictions by defendants who were led to reject
a plea offer by bad advice. Thus far it is generally held that Frye and Cooper did
not make “new law” for purposes of federal habeas. See, e.g., Hare v. United
States, 688 F.3d 878, 879 (7th Cir. 2012). Since Cooper was a state case reversed
on habeas by the Court, there seems to be little room for arguing otherwise.
151. Lafler, 132 S. Ct. at 1392 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
152. On this possibility, see Donald A. Dripps, Plea Bargaining and the
Supreme Court: The End of the Beginning?, 25 FED. SENT’G REP. 141, 142 (2012).
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scholarship needs to do is less to devise fresh doctrinal avenues
to a stronger defense function than to explore whether there are
legitimate doctrinal avenues for reconsidering Harmelin153 and
Bordenkircher.
If a majority of the justices wants to reinvigorate the defense
function, the doctrinal tools are readily at hand. The judicial will
may well be lacking. If, however, we do witness a second criminal
procedure revolution, it will fail, as did the first, unless the Court
perceives the systemic feedback loops and can find legitimate
doctrinal ways to channel them.
B. A Conservative Agenda
Liberal process theory turns to judicial review precisely
because when legislatures have intervened in the criminal justice
process, they have all but invariably acted to criminalize new
conduct and increase existing penalties, without regulating the
discretion of police and prosecutors. Conservative hostility to
judicial intervention, however, does not necessarily imply
complacency with mass incarceration and prosecutorial
dominance. An important strand of contemporary conservative
thought indeed sees the modern criminal justice system as big
government with its usual defects.
Almost fifteen years ago, John Dilulio decided that “two
million prisoners are enough.”154 Chief Justice Rehnquist
lamented the indiscriminate federalization of criminal law.155
More recently, Edwin Meese III has led a “Right on Crime”
movement aimed at responsible reductions in incarceration, a
movement supported by several leading conservatives.156 The
153. Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957 (1991).
154. John Dilulio, Two Million Prisoners Are Enough, WALL ST. J., Mar. 12,
1999, at A14.
155. See William H. Rehnquist, Remarks on the Federalization of Criminal
Law, Address Before the American Law Institute (May 11, 1998), in 11 FED.
SENTENCING REP. 132 (1998) (stating that the number of cases brought into
federal court through the federalization of state crime is straining judicial
resources).
156. Charles Savage, Trend to Lighten Harsh Sentences Catches on in
Conservative States, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 12, 2011), http://www.nytimes.com/2011/
08/13/us/13penal.html?_r =18 (last visited Apr. 2, 2013) (noting that the “Right
on Crime” movement supported by Edwin Meese III, Newt Gingrich, Grover
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arbitrary power of contemporary prosecutors sits uncomfortably
with conservative principles.157
For principled conservatives dismayed by the excesses of
American criminal justice but loathe to embrace judicial
intervention, the responsible course is to engage the political
branches. Professor Broughton puts it well:
But there are natural political consequences—or, more
accurately, obligations—if conservatives adhere to this
critique. If conservatives insist on a judiciary that is as
deferential to political actors as the one I have described,
thereby leaving the Eighth Amendment and judicial review as
ineffectual constraints on criminal punishment, then they
must be prepared to advocate political action that will chain
the American criminal justice Leviathan.158

Any such political campaign confronts at least two major
challenges.
The first is the continued perception of professional
politicians that anything smacking of “soft on crime” is political
suicide.159 The second is the integrated nature of the justice
system’s component parts—federal, state, and local, as well as
substantive criminal law, funding decisions, prosecutorial
discretion, and constitutional court decisions. Incremental reform
risks unintended consequences; sweeping proposals have even
less of a chance of political success.
The logical course for those who seek reform through
legislation is to seek from the legislature a commitment to take
seriously a set of recommendations from a broadly-based
Norquist, Asa Hutchinson, and William Bennett) (on file with the Washington
and Lee Law Review).
157. Cf. BARRY GOLDWATER, THE CONSCIENCE OF A CONSERVATIVE 57 (1960)
(“The enemy of freedom is unrestrained power, and the champions of freedom
will fight against the concentration of power wherever they find it.”).
Goldwater’s specific context was monopoly power, but his principle is general
and it might fairly be added that the modern prosecutor is a monopolist.
158. J. Richard Broughton, Some Reflections on Conservative Politics and
the Limits of the Criminal Sanction, 4 CHARLESTON L. REV. 537, 558 (2010).
159. See, e.g., TONRY, supra note 9, at 4
Americans are having second thoughts about the wisdom of current
antidrug and anticrime policies, but elected politicians most places
are afraid to change them. To do so runs risks of being tarred as soft
on crime and, until significant numbers of politicians take that risk
and get reelected, most will not take the chance.
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comprehensive study of the criminal justice system. Former
Senator Jim Webb proposed The National Criminal Justice
Commission Act, which has yet to become law but in prior
incarnations has passed the House and been reported out of the
Senate Judiciary Committee.160 The bill has the support of the
ABA, the Innocence Movement, and the International Association
of Chiefs of Police.161
Liberals have some cause for skepticism about the
commission approach. The last national commission, the 1967
President’s Commission on Law Enforcement and Administration
of Justice, produced a superb report.162 The report triggered
congressional legislation subsidizing local police, repudiating
Miranda, and authorizing wiretapping.163
Yet those who seek reform should not permit their fears to
frustrate their hopes. Some 2012 election results hint at a new
public mood about crime and punishment. Voters in Washington
State and Colorado passed ballot measures legalizing marijuana
possession,164 and a recent poll shows a slim national majority in
favor of withholding federal enforcement in states that have
legalized.165 California voters rolled back the notorious “three
160. See National Criminal Justice Commission Act of 2010, S. 714, 111th
Cong. (2010).
161. See id.
162. PRESIDENT’S COMM’N ON LAW ENFORCEMENT & ADMIN. OF JUSTICE, THE
CHALLENGE OF CRIME IN A FREE SOCIETY (1967).
163. See Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968, 42 U.S.C.
§ 3711 (1968). If the title of the statute is thought insufficiently suggestive, the
relevant legislative history frankly declares: “The major purpose of Title III is to
combat organized crime.” S. REP. NO. 90-1097, at 2153–58 (1968), reprinted in
1968 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2112, 2157. The unofficial history of Title III reveals
unmistakably the law-enforcement orientation of the legislation. See Richard
Harris, Annals of Legislation—the Turning Point, NEW YORKER, Dec. 14, 1968,
at 68, 164–76 (discussing legislators’ sense of public demand for tough-on-crime
policies).
164. See, e.g., Aaron Smith, Marijuana Legalization Passes Colorado,
Washington, CNNMONEY, http://money.cnn.com/2012/11/07/news/economy/mari
juana-legalization-washington-colorado/index.html (last visited Apr. 2, 2013)
(“Voters in Washington and Colorado passed ballot initiatives Tuesday to
legalize marijuana for recreational use.”) (on file with the Washington and Lee
Law Review).
165. Micah Cohen, Marijuana Legalization and States Rights, N.Y. TIMES
(Dec. 9, 2012), http://fivethirtyeight.blogs.nytimes.com/2012/12/08/marijuanalegalization-and-states-rights/ (last visited Apr. 2, 2013) (on file with the
Washington and Lee Law Review).
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strikes” law by requiring a conviction for a violent offense for the
third “strike,” and made the change effective retroactively.166
Liberals have good reasons for skepticism about the political
prospects, but ought to support any legislative movement to
ratchet down penalties and regulate prosecutorial discretion.
Likewise conservatives should not be too rigid in opposing reform
from the courts. After all, the Court has given legislatures carte
blanche for thirty years, and the results have been lamentable.
And it is possible that some strong signals from the Court might
be the catalyst that, like a commission, both prompts reforms and
gives reformers some political protection.
Constitutional history shows that the Court’s successful
interventions are those that either prompt or parallel prevailing
political opinion. Brown v. Board of Education167 reflected a
national consensus against Southern segregation and led to
actual desegregation only after the Civil Rights Act of 1964.168
The Court recognized equal protection rights for women only
after Congress proposed the Equal Rights Amendment.169 It
166. See Debra Cassens Weiss, A Third of Three Strikes Inmates in
California Could Benefit from Vote to Ease Law, A.B.A. J. (Nov. 8, 2012),
http://www.abajournal.com/news/article/a_third_of_three-strikes_inmates_in_
california_could_benefit_by_vote_to_eas/ (last visited Apr. 2, 2013) (on file with
the Washington and Lee Law Review).
167. Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
168. See, e.g., William N. Eskridge, Jr., Some Effects of Identity-Based Social
Movements on Constitutional Law in the Twentieth Century, 100 MICH. L. REV.
2062, 2392 (2002)
Little desegregation occurred between 1955 and 1966, in large part
because the Supreme Court was uncertain as to how enthusiastically
district judges would follow its lead and whether the Eisenhower
Administration would back it up. Actual integration occurred all over
the South between 1966 and 1971, in large part because the Johnson
Administration and the Warren Court both pressed school districts to
take affirmative action to integrate (and districts risked losing
needed federal money if they did not). The Court’s sex discrimination
cases were easier for the nation to swallow because they were
congruent with legislative reforms in states all over the country.
169. See, e.g., Reva B. Siegal, Constitutional Culture, Social Movement
Conflict and Constitutional Change: The Case of the de facto ERA, 94 CALIF. L.
REV. 1323, 1324 (2006)
In the 1970s, a mobilized feminist movement persuaded Congress to
send an Equal Rights Amendment to the states for ratification. With
energetic countermobilization, the ERA was defeated. In this same
period, the Court began to interpret the Fourteenth Amendment in
ways that were responsive to the amendment’s proponents—so much
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overruled Bowers v. Hardwick170 after the great majority of the
states, Georgia included, had abandoned their sodomy statutes,
either by legislation or judicial decision.171 Lawrence v. Texas172
was followed within a decade by repeal of Don’t Ask Don’t Tell.173
This past November voters in three more states authorized gay
marriage.174
So liberals and conservatives should see appeals to the courts
and a new commission as complementary. Hope from legislatures
might prompt action by the courts, and action by the courts might
prompt action from legislatures.
Signs of a fresh judicial assault on the status quo might
reinforce the case for a commission, and also reinforce the
political defense of elected leaders who act to approve
recommended reforms. A commission might stimulate a political
movement to roll back mass incarceration. If it turns out that
even a commission is beyond the range of current political vision,
so that scholars have begun to refer to the resulting body of equal
protection case law as a “de facto ERA.”
(footnote omitted).
170. Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986), overruled by Lawrence v.
Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 578 (2003).
171. See Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 573
The 25 States with laws prohibiting the relevant conduct referenced
in the Bowers decision are reduced now to 13, of which 4 enforce their
laws only against homosexual conduct. In those States where sodomy
is still proscribed, whether for same-sex or heterosexual conduct,
there is a pattern of nonenforcement with respect to consenting
adults acting in private.
See also Powell v. State, 510 S.E.2d 18, 26 (Ga. 1998) (holding sodomy statute
contrary to state constitution’s right of privacy); Jack M. Balkin, What Brown
Teaches Us About Constitutional Theory, 90 VA. L. REV. 1537, 1543 (2004) (“By
the time Lawrence was decided, the movement for gay rights had gained more
success in winning over popular opinion and shifting popular attitudes in favor
of decriminalization than the corresponding movement for desegregation had
achieved when Brown was decided.”).
172. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 578 (2003).
173. See Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell Repeal Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-321, 124
Stat. 3515.
174. See, e.g., Lila Shapiro, Gay Marriage Victory in Maine, Maryland;
Minnesota Votes Down ‘Traditional’ Amendment, HUFFINGTON POST (Nov. 7,
2012), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/11/07/gay-marriage-victory_n_20859
00.html (last visited Apr. 2, 2013) (“On Election Day Tuesday, voters in Maine,
Maryland and Washington chose to legalize gay marriage.”) (on file with the
Washington and Lee Law Review).
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the liberals’ case for judicial review would be correspondingly
strengthened. If instead substantial reforms passed into law, the
Justices could weigh the results when they consider, for example,
whether to modify Strickland or Bordenkircher.
C. A Pragmatic Agenda
At present indigent defense is constitutionally required, but
only in anemic form. Legislators have consistently failed to
provide the levels of funding that would be required for even
minimally adequate representation. For the immediate future
there is little prospect of dramatic changes from either the
Judicial or the Legislative Branch. And as we have seen, standing
alone, a more vigorous defense function could do little to resist
legislative excess or executive caprice.
This unhappy state of affairs calls for rational allocation of
the distinctly limited resources. Darryl Brown is right that if we
have never known anything but underfunding of indigent
defense, “rationing occurs whether or not it is thoughtful and
deliberate.”175 He would have defenders concentrate on pressing
plausible claims of factual innocence and resisting charges
carrying the heaviest penalties.176 I have recently suggested some
alternative approaches: eliminating the right to appointed
counsel in felony cases that do not carry sentences of
incarceration, giving appellate defenders discretion to decline
unpromising appeals, and permitting defense representation by
lay advocates and trained specialists rather than generalist
lawyers.177 The more seriously these proposals are taken, the
more likely they are to shame judges and legislators into taking
some constructive steps. If it turns out that shame is not
enough—as it hitherto has proved to be178—then indeed rationing
would seem to be the logical course.
175. Darryl K. Brown, Rationing Criminal Defense Entitlements: An
Argument from Institutional Design, 104 COLUM. L. REV. 801, 834 (2004).
176. Id. at 818 (“[W]e should distribute limited defense resources (1) toward
strategies more likely to vindicate factual innocence, and (2) toward charges and
clients who have the most at stake or are likely to gain the greatest life benefit.”
(footnote omitted)).
177. Dripps, Up from Gideon, supra note 73.
178. “Shameful” is the term widely and justly applied. For example, a term
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VI. Conclusion

Gideon failed both because legislators undervalue the rights
of the accused and because prosecutors and legislators exploited
their unconstrained power over charge selection and sentence
severity. Liberals see a case for constitutional constraints on
charge selection and sentence severity. Conservatives see a case
for reaching the same ends through other channels.
A stronger defense function is essential to comprehensive
reform, but, standing alone, would do little to restore a truly
adversarial system. Liberals should applaud political efforts to
secure comprehensive criminal justice reform from the political
branches. If those efforts come to naught, as they so often have,
conservatives may need to reconsider whether addressing “the
disaster that is contemporary American criminal justice”179 is
really less important than an abstract commitment against
judicial activism.

search on December 9, 2012 for “indigent defense” /p shameful in the Westlaw
Law Reviews and Journals database produced thirteen hits.
179. STUNTZ, COLLAPSE, supra note 97, at 307.

